Introduction
One of the most pronounced trends in the world economy over the last decades has been the rise in foreign direct investment and multinational activity. In the United States, for example, foreign pro…ts made up around 5 per cent of all corporate pro…ts earned by U.S. …rms until the late 1960s, but this share has meanwhile risen to more than 25 per cent, and is probably even higher (Desai and Hines, 2004) . As a consequence of this development national corporate tax bases have become more sensitive to tax changes. 2 Most of the literature on international tax competition has therefore modelled economic integration as a pure increase in the mobility of the capital tax base. In these models the typical result is that increasing capital mobility leads governments to undercut each other's capital income tax rates, resulting in underprovision of public goods as well as relatively higher taxes on immobile factors (see Wilson, 1999 for a survey).
Empirical evidence in support of this theoretical prediction is mixed, however. Table 1 summarizes the development of corporate tax rates and tax revenues in a representative sample of OECD countries. Two stylized facts stand out. First, statutory corporate tax rates have been signi…cantly reduced in most OECD countries since the 1980s, but tax bases have simultaneously been broadened. As a consequence, e¤ective tax rates on pro…ts have fallen by much less than statutory rates, and in several countries they have not fallen at all. 3 Second, an even more signi…cant deviation from the standard theory of tax competition arises with respect to the development of tax revenue as a share of GDP. Corporate tax revenue has increased signi…cantly in most countries since the early 1980s, despite the average fall in e¤ective tax rates. 4 The present short paper proposes a simple model to reconcile the theory of tax com-2 This tax sensitivity may arise either from the location and investment decisions of multinational …rms, or from pro…t-shifting activities. The empirical evidence on the e¤ects of taxes on …rm location and pro…t-shifting is surveyed in Hines (1999) and, more recently, Devereux (2006) . 3 The measures shown in Table 1 are the e¤ ective marginal tax rate (EMTR) and the e¤ ective average tax rate (EATR). The EATR can be seen as a weighted average of the statutory tax rate and the EMTR, where the latter is the tax rate on an investment that just earns a net rate of return equal to the going interest rate. The weight of the statutory tax rate in the EATR rises with the pro…tability that is assumed for the underlying investment project. For a description of these measures and further details on the development of corporate taxation since the 1980s, see Devereux et al. (2002) . 4 The di¤erent time trends for di¤erent measures of corporate taxation also seem to be the main source of diverging results in the econometric literature that tests the relationship between economic integration and the level of corporate taxation. This relationship is typically negative if the latter is measured by statutory or e¤ective average tax rates, but the negative sign disappears when tax revenue is the dependent variable. See Rodrik (1997) , Bretschger and Hettich (2002) , Swank and Steinmo (2002) , Slemrod (2004) and Winner (2005) . petition with these empirical observations. Our central argument is that economic integration a¤ects not only the mobility of the corporate tax base, but it simultaneously increases its size through a higher pro…tability of incorporated …rms. 5 These twin e¤ects of economic integration are embedded into a stylized political economy model. The simplicity of our framework allows us to derive reduced-form expressions for the optimal redistributive tax rates chosen by the median voter. In this model economic integration increases both the redistributive gains, but also the e¢ ciency costs of taxation from the perspective of the median voter. Hence globalization may raise or lower the redistributive tax rate in the political economy equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that tax revenue may rise in the symmetric Nash equilibrium, even if the equilibrium tax rate is reduced.
Our argument that economic integration increases the pro…tability of …rms is based, in particular, on the development of multinational enterprises (MNEs). Empirical evidence from the international trade literature shows that multinational …rms are on average more productive than local …rms (see e.g., Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004) . This di¤erence in productivity and pro…tability can be explained, for example, by the ability of MNEs to utilize di¤erences in international factor prices (Helpman and Krugman, 1985) . Productivity growth and rising pro…ts will thus arise at the industry level when economic integration reallocates market shares from domestic to more productive multinational …rms (Melitz, 2003) . Recent empirical evidence for the U.S. manufacturing industry shows that economic integration leads to productivity growth both at the …rm and at the industry level (Bernard et al., 2006) . Similar evidence is obtained for the United Kingdom, where the shift towards the service sector, and in particular towards the highly pro…table banking, …nance and insurance branches is one of the factors explaining the rise in corporate tax revenues over the last two decades (Devereux et al., 2004) . With few exceptions, however, these developments have not yet been incorporated in the international tax literature. 5 Another argument why corporate tax bases may have increased is that a rising share of …rms has chosen an organizational form that subjects them to corporate rather than personal income tax. We do not further pursue this argument here, but acknowledge that it plays a complementary role in explaining the increase in corporate tax bases. See Sørensen (2007, sec. 2 .2) for further discussion. 6 A partial exception are models of industry agglomeration where economic integration will, for some range of transports costs, increase the agglomeration rents that …rms can earn in the core country and hence increase this country's taxing power (Kind et al., 2000; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Borck and P ‡üger, 2006) . However, in these models the increase in pro…tability in response to economic integration is limited to …rms located in core countries, and it occurs only for a limited range of trade costs. A di¤erent approach to explain ambiguous tax responses to economic integration is pursued by Fuest (2005) . In his model economic integration raises the share of foreign …rm ownership and thus strengthens the incentive to tax the pro…ts accruing to foreigners. However, this last e¤ect can only
The basic model that underlies our analysis is presented in section 2. Section 3 analyzes the e¤ects of economic integration on the redistributive tax rate and tax revenues in the Nash equilibrium. Section 4 concludes.
The model
We consider a model of two countries, denoted by subscript i 2 f1; 2g, which are populated by two types of individuals, capitalists (superscript C) and workers (superscript L). The two countries are identical, except for the share of workers and capitalists in the overall population. To minimize notation, we assume that each worker exogenously supplies one unit of labour and consumes an aggregate consumption good whose price is normalized to one. In each country i it takes one unit of domestic labour to produce one unit of the numeraire good. Competitive market conditions then determine that the wage rate equals one and each worker receives a gross wage income of unity, whereas the representative capitalist's pro…t income is zero when domestic labour is employed. However, each capitalist can set up a MNE and earn positive pro…ts when a MNE headquartered in country i sets up a subsidiary in the other country j (j 6 = i).
In this case it takes only w 1 units of the other country's labor to produce one unit of output. In a highly stylized way, this set-up captures either idiosyncratic e¢ ciency gains accruing from a multinational structure, or a (symmetric) advantage for each country to obtain lower factor prices abroad.
Each country levies a proportional, comprehensive income tax at rate t i on all wage and pro…t income. The labour tax base is internationally immobile, whereas the pro…t tax base is responsive to tax di¤erentials between the two countries. Hence capitalists in each country face two decisions: they choose (i) how much to produce abroad and (ii) how much pro…t to shift between the two countries. Both of these decisions have been extensively discussed in the literature. We incorporate them here in a way that keeps our argument as simple as possible.
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We …rst turn to the decision of how much output each MNE residing in country i produces in the foreign country j. While foreign labour input is cheaper in e¢ ciency dominate the role of increased tax base mobility, if the government can also use import tari¤s. 7 Hau ‡er et al. (2006) also consider the determination of income taxes in the presence of multinational …rms. In their analysis, however, only the pro…t-shifting decision of the MNE is modelled. Hence, as in much of the tax literature, gains from globalisation are absent and the feedback e¤ects of increased corporate pro…tability on tax policy, which are central to the analysis here, do not arise. Instead the focus of their analysis is to investigate, both theoretically and empirically, the e¤ects that di¤erent country-speci…c variables have on the mix of wage and pro…t taxes in small open economies.
units, producing abroad adds extra transaction costs that must be given a wide interpretation (i.e, they apply to costs related to adopting to a new cultural and legal environment, information and monitoring costs etc.). We model these costs as being convex in the volume of foreign production re ‡ecting, for example, increasing marginal monitoring costs when larger parts of production are outsourced. 8 For simplicity we specify quadratic costs of the form = x 2 i =(2 ), where x i is the volume of …rm i's production abroad and 1= is the cost parameter. We interpret the inverse of the cost parameter, , as a measure of economic integration. Increasing economic integration (a rise in ) will reduce the transaction costs for foreign direct investment. With these speci…cations the before-tax pro…ts of each …rm, which equal the gross pro…ts of capitalists in both countries, are given by
The second decision of capitalists concerns the distribution of gross pro…ts for tax purposes. We assume that the residence principle is legally in place so that pro…ts are taxed in the country where the …rm is headquartered. However, a MNE headquartered in country i may be able to shift some of the pro…ts earned to country j, either through transfer pricing or by using tax-e¢ cient …nancing structures. 9 Let be the share of pro…ts that is transferred to country j in this way. As in the case of the …rm's production decisions it is costly to engage in pro…t shifting activities and the deadweight costs are convex in the amount of pro…ts transferred abroad. Hence, by analogy to the transaction costs incurred when …rms produce abroad, the real resources spent when transferring pro…ts are " = 2 =(2 ). Assuming further that the transaction costs are tax-deductible in both countries, the after-tax income of each capitalist, y C i , is thus
where i is given in (1).
It is seen from equation (2) that for each …rm the output decision (x i ) is separated from the decision on pro…t shifting ( i ). 10 From (1) each MNE in country i maximizes 8 This is in line with some of the …ndings in the new theory of the multinational …rm (see Marin and Verdier, 2003) . 9 Income can be shifted through borrowing and lending between the multinational's a¢ liates, because the interest paid on this internal loan is taxable in the lending country, but tax-deductible in the borrowing country. See Mintz and Smart (2004) for a detailed modelling of this tax avoidance mechanism. 10 This results from the speci…cation of the transaction cost functions and ". With more general its gross pro…ts by choosing
where we have introduced w as a short-hand notation for the exogenous cost advantage of producing one unit of output abroad.
Substituting (3) in (1) yields the maximized gross pro…ts of each …rm
From (3) and (4) the level of output produced abroad and maximized gross pro…ts for each MNE are a rising function of the unit wage di¤erential and of the degree of economic integration. Moreover maximized gross pro…ts for each capitalist will be the same in countries 1 and 2, due to the symmetry assumptions made with respect to production.
To maximize net pro…ts the optimal level of i is derived from (2). This yields
It thus follows from (4) and (5) that economic integration (a rise in ) will raise the gross pro…ts of each …rm, but at the same time it increases the share of pro…ts that is shifted for any given international tax di¤erential.
Tax equilibrium and economic integration
In each country i 2 f1; 2g, the total population is normalized to unity and consists of i workers and (1 i ) capitalists. The share of workers i is allowed to di¤er in the two countries. However, workers form the majority of the population in both countries (1 > i > 0:5 8 i) and tax policy in each country is determined by the median voter. In line with the basic theory of optimal income taxation, we assume that overall tax revenue is redistributed, in equal per-capita terms, to the entire population. Hence we can simply maximize the after-tax income of the representative worker in each country. This is given by y L i = (1 t i ) + R i , where the gross wage income is unity and R i are per-capita tax collections. 11 speci…cations, the output and pro…t shifting decisions will interact. Modelling this interaction would, however, signi…cantly complicate the analysis without qualitatively changing our main results. The separation of output and pro…t-shifting decisions is a common assumption in the literature; see the survey by Gresik (2001) . 11 The latter equal total tax collections by our normalization of population size. Note that a wellde…ned optimal tax rate is obtained in our model, despite the linearity of the objective function, because the excess burden of taxation is strictly convex in the tax rate.
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The tax base in country i is wage income plus the shares of pro…t income from all …rms that are reported in country i. Using the optimal tax avoidance decision of each capitalist [eq. (5)], total and per capita tax revenues in country i are
In this expression, the overbraced term (1) denotes the pro…ts of the MNEs headquartered in country i that are reported in their country of residence whereas term (2) gives the pro…ts of country j's MNEs that are shifted to country i.
Using (6), the after-tax income of the representative worker in country i is
The equilibrium policy maximizes y L i with respect to the proportional income tax t i . This yields the best response functions
Hence best responses are upward-sloping in both countries. Moreover, in the simple model used here, tax rates in the asymmetric Nash equilibrium can be calculated in explicit form:
where is given in (4). Note …rst that a necessary condition for the redistributive tax rates to be positive in both countries is that the gross pro…ts earned by each capitalist exceed the gross wage (normalized to one) of the representative worker in each region. This will be assumed in what follows. Equation (9) further shows that the country with the higher share of workers will levy the lower redistributive tax rate. For concreteness assume 1 > 2 so that country 1 chooses a lower tax rate than country 2. The reason is that there are fewer capitalists and hence lower aggregate pro…ts (1 ) in country 1 so that equality between the redistributive gains from the tax and the convex e¢ ciency losses is reached at a lower tax rate. Finally, if the countries are symmetric, equation (9) immediately reduces to t 1 = t 2 = ( 1)=(2 ) > 0.
The core issue underlying our analysis is whether economic integration, as described by an increase in , leads to a rise or a fall in the Nash equilibrium tax rates. Di¤er-entiating (9) with respect to , using d =d = ( w) 2 =2 from (4) and resubstituting 7 the tax rate in (9) yields
Equation (10) shows two counteracting e¤ects of economic integration. The …rst term captures the increased e¢ ciency costs of redistributive taxation when economic integration makes the domestic pro…t tax base more mobile internationally and increases international pro…t-shifting. This e¤ect is unambiguously negative, if the equilibrium tax rate (9) is positive. The second e¤ect describes the additional redistributive gains from the income tax when economic integration raises the pro…ts of multinational …rms and hence capitalists in both countries. Both the negative …rst e¤ect and the positive second e¤ect are larger in the high-tax country 2 (which has the larger number of capitalists). Depending on which of the two e¤ects dominates, economic integration may thus either raise or lower the redistributive tax rate chosen by the median voter. 12 We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Economic integration tends to increase (decrease) the redistributive income tax rate, if (i) the equilibrium tax rate is small (large) in the initial equilibrium and (ii) if the cost advantage of producing one unit of output abroad is large (small).
Given the empirical evidence in Table 1 that overall corporate tax rates have been falling, the negative …rst e¤ect in equation (10) seems to be dominating, on average. From Proposition 1 we should then expect to observe a less pronounced trend towards falling tax rates in the countries that have low taxes initially. A comparison with the country data collected in Table 1 shows that there is indeed support for this hypothesis. Those countries which lowered their e¤ective average tax rates only marginally or not at all during the period 1982-2005 (Canada, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom), were also the ones that started out with tax rates below the sample average. In contrast the countries with the highest statutory tax rates in 1982 (Austria, Germany and Sweden) all enacted severe cuts in statutory and e¤ective tax rates. This convergence of tax rates in response to economic integration is consistent with the results of our model.
12 Note the di¤erence between our results and those derived in political economy models of strategic delegation (Persson and Tabellini, 1992; Gottschalk and Peters, 2003) . In these models the working majority is able to mitigate the downward pressure on capital tax rates by delegating decisions to politicians that prefer a larger degree of redistribution than the median voter herself. Nevertheless, the only direct e¤ect of economic integration is increased tax base mobility. As a consequence economic integration leads, in equilibrium, to an unambiguous decline in the level of redistributive taxation.
8
Finally we evaluate the e¤ects of economic integration on tax revenue. Since the focus here is not on cross-country di¤erences, but on the average relationship between tax rates and tax revenue collections, we con…ne the analysis to the case where countries are symmetric in all respects ( 1 = 2 ). Hence tax rates are identical and no pro…t-shifting occurs in the Nash equilibrium. Using this in (6) and di¤erentiating with respect to
where the squared bracket in the …rst term must be positive to ensure that a tax rise increases revenues. Since the second term on the RHS of (11) is unambiguously positive from (4) this immediately establishes:
Proposition 2 In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, a positive e¤ect of economic integration on the level of equilibrium tax rates is su¢ cient, but not necessary, for an increase in tax revenue.
This result is easily explained. In our model economic integration simultaneously increases the elasticity of the tax base and increases its size by raising the pro…tability of multinational …rms. While both of these e¤ects determine the optimal adjustment of taxes (which is thus ambiguous, even in a symmetric equilibrium) the increase in the corporate tax base exerts a positive e¤ect on tax revenue even if tax rates stay constant. Ignoring cross-country di¤erences and hence pro…t shifting in equilibrium ensures that this tax base increase bene…ts both countries simultaneously. Applied to the empirical …ndings in Table 1 this proposition shows that it is possible to simultaneously observe decreasing (e¤ective) corporation taxes and increasing corporate tax revenues as economic integration proceeds.
Conclusion
This paper has started from two fundamental e¤ects that are associated with the rise in foreign direct investment and multinational …rm activity. In contrast to nationally operating …rms, multinationals have the opportunity to shift pro…ts to low-tax countries, but they are also more pro…table and thus raise the aggregate pro…tability in the corporate sector. Incorporating these facts into a simple political economy model we have shown that economic integration increases the e¢ ciency cost of capital taxation, but it also increases the redistributive bene…ts of the tax from the perspective of the median voter. This result may help in explaining why several OECD countries have not reduced their e¤ective rates of corporation tax since the 1980s. Moreover, our model implies that corporate tax revenues may rise despite falling tax rates, a …nding that is consistent with the experience of the majority of OECD countries during the last decades.
It goes without saying that the model put forth in this paper is stylized in many respects. In particular, core simpli…cations have been the assumptions of exogenous factor prices and productivity gains from a multinational operation, and the modelling of the (personal and corporate) income tax system through a single, proportional tax rate. We would argue, however, that the basic e¤ects outlined above would still be present in a more complex model. At the same time we believe that incorporating a more detailed modelling of multinational …rms into the analysis of taxation and other government policies is a promising area for further research.
